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ABSTRACT	  The	   “January	   25	   Revolution”	  was	   not	   a	   classic	   revolution.	   President	  Muba-­‐
rak’s	  fall	  did	  not	  entail	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime,	  neither	  alter	  the	  elites	  or	  destroy	  their	  
institutions,	   nor	   reverse	   the	   social	   situation.	   Although	   power	   structures	   and	   economic	  
patterns	  were	  not	  removed,	  Mubarak’s	  fall	  set	  an	  end	  to	  exclusive	  authoritarian	  despotism	  
and	  initiated	  a	  process	  of	  power	  sharing;	  a	  so	  called	  passive	  revolution	  characterised	  by	  the	  
absorption	  of	  the	  “enemies’	  elites”	   into	  the	  system.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   legalisation	  has	  
been	   only	   a	   further	   step	   in	   the	   Islamists’	   long	   and	   rocky	   road	   of	   integration	   through	  
moderation.	   Initially	   based	   on	   tactical	   considerations,	   shifts	   in	   methods	   and	   behaviour	  
usually	  also	  evoke	  a	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  from	  ideological	  conceptions	  to	  political	  pragmatism.	  
The	   absorption	   of	   the	   Islamist	   elites	   supported	   a	   process	   of	   embourgeoisement	   and	   de-­‐
ideologization.	   This	   did	   not	   entail	   a	   departure	   from	   Islamic	   tenets,	   but	   rather	   from	  
ideological	  conceptions	  which	  seemed	  more	  and	  more	  unrealistic	  in	  a	  globalized	  world.	  The	  
integration	   of	   de-­‐radicalised	   and	   moderated	   socially	   conservative	   Islamist	   groups	   with	  
market	  economy	  and	  parliamentary	  democracy	  promises	  not	  only	  the	  prevention	  of	  political	  
and	   economic	   turmoil,	   but	   also	   guarantees	   the	   reinforcement	   of	   the	   existing	   patterns	   of	  
domination.	  	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  Islam	  
From	   1973	   on	   Egypt	   experienced	   infitah;	  
economic	  liberalisation.	  Infitah	  implied	  the	  
radical	  departure	   from	  Nasserist	   state-­‐led	  
industrialisation	   and	   modernisation	   poli-­‐
cies.	   Just	   like	   in	   many	   other	   countries,	  
economic	  liberalisation	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  
with	   “Islamisation”.	   Islamisation	   defines	  
neo-­‐conservative	   social	   and	   cultural	  
policies	   emanated	   by	   state	   institutions.	   A	  
bundle	   of	   measures	   including	   a	   rise	   in	  
religious	  programs	  on	  TV	  and	  radio,	  a	  new	  
emphasis	   on	   religious	   values	   in	   school	  
curricula	   and	   an	   increased	   use	   of	   Islamic	  
symbols	  in	  the	  public	  space.	  Consequently,	  
Islamic	   symbols,	   concepts,	   rhetoric	   and	  
behaviour	   began	   to	   dominate	   the	   public	  
space	   and	   have	   increasingly	   permeated	  
the	   everyday	   lives	   of	   many	   Egyptians.	  	  
Islamisation	   as	   a	   state	   policy	   aimed	   at	  
filling	   the	   void	   which	   had	   emerged	   after	  
the	  debacle	  of	   the	  1967	  War	  and	   the	  de-­‐



























legitimization	   of	   Nasserist	   modernisation	  
concepts	   and	   it	   was	   considered	   as	   a	  
means	  to	  placate	  social	  discontent.	  Hence,	  
Islamisation	   aimed	   at	   restoring	   the	  
regime’s	  authority.	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   “Islamisation”	   encoura-­‐
ged	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   heterogeneous	  
and	   vivid	   Islamic	   movement.	   A	   whole	  
industry	   of	   an	   Islamic	   civil	   society	  
emerged.	   Under	   the	   benevolent	   eyes	   of	  
the	   state	   –	   the	   regime	   regarded	   them	   as	  
an	   antidote	   to	   leftist	   and	   communist	  
movements	   –	   a	   huge	   number	   of	   associa-­‐
tions,	   independent	   mos-­‐
ques	   and	   street	   sheikhs	  
became	  the	  agents	  of	  a	  new	  
Islamic	  conservatism.	  	  
But	   this	   policy	   also	   limited	  
the	   government’s	   scope	   of	  
action	   in	   directing	   and	  
influencing	   social	   policy.	   In	  
the	   light	   of	   economic	   ad-­‐
justment	   programs	   which	  
aimed	  at	  creating	  a	  slimmer	  
state,	   Islamic	   welfare	   and	   charity	  
organisations	   gradually	   compensated	   the	  
state’s	   eroding	   welfare	   services.	   Parti-­‐
cularly	   in	   remote	   and	   neglected	   areas,	  
Islamic	   organisations	   challenged	   the	  
state’s	  hegemony.	  	  
Whereas	   Islamic	  conservative	  movements	  
began	  to	  dominate	  large	  parts	  of	  Egyptian	  
society,	   the	   regime	   paid	   attention	   to	  
contain	   their	   activities	   and	   to	   confine	  
them	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  non-­‐political	  
sphere.	   In	   contrast	   to	   his	   two	   prede-­‐
cessors,	   President	   Mubarak	   hoped	   to	  
control	   a	   growing	   Islamist	   movement	  
through	  the	  controlled	  inclusion	  of	  moder-­‐
ate	   mainstream	   Islamist	   opposition	   into	  
the	   system.1	   Members	   of	   the	   Muslim	  
Brotherhood	  were	  allowed	  to	  run	  as	  inde-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Augustus	   Norton	   in:	   Hefner,	   Robert	   W.	   (ed.).	  
(2005),	   Remaking	   Muslim	   Politics.	   Pluralism,	  
Contestation;	  Democratization,	  Princeton.	  	  	  
pendent	  candidates	   in	  elections	  and	  were	  
represented	   in	   parliament.	   At	   the	   same	  
time	   the	   regime	   denied	   Islamists	   any	  
legalisation	   and	   it	   paid	   attention	   to	   limit	  
Islamist	   representation	   in	   parliament	  
through	   election	   fraud	   and	   gerryman-­‐
dering.	  	  
The	   Mubarak	   regime’s	   tactic	   can	   be	  
summarised	   as	   one	   of	   embracing	   Islamic	  
demands	  in	  principle	  in	  order	  to	  neutralise	  
them	  in	  practice.	  However,	  this	  tactic	  was	  
not	   without	   a	   price.	   Conservative	   forces	  
began	   to	  permeate	   state	   institutions.	  The	  
number	   of	   ultra-­‐conser-­‐
vative	   clergymen,	   judges	  
and	   bureaucrats	   within	  
state	   institutions	   grew.	  
Their	  fatwas,	  verdicts	  and	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	   decisions	   be-­‐
gan	   to	   challenge	   the	  
hegemony	   of	   the	   inhe-­‐
rently	   secular	   regime	  
from	   within.	   	   The	   regi-­‐
me’s	   tactic	   guaranteed	  
that	   political	   Islam	   was	   not	   able	   to	  
engender	   regime	   change,	   but	   it	   also	  
turned	   Egypt	   into	   an	   overwhelmingly	  
conservative	  “Islamic	  society”.	  	  
After	  Mubarak	  
The	  fall	  of	  President	  Mubarak	  on	  February	  
13,	   2011	   was	   not	   brought	   about	   by	  
Islamists,	   but	   it	   was	   rather	   a	   young	   and	  
disappointed	   mainly	   bourgeois	   youth	  
which	   felt	   frustrated	  with	   stagnation	   and	  
which	  saw	  in	  a	  highly	  clientalistic	  economy	  
only	  limited	  future	  prospects.	  	  	  
Although,	   the	   events	   which	   led	   to	  
President	   Mubarak’s	   departure	   were	  
enthusiastically	  labelled	  as	  the	  “January	  25	  
Revolution”,	   Mubarak’s	   resignation	   later	  
turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
fall	   of	   the	   regime,	   but	   rather	   as	   the	  
regime’s	  necessary	  concession	   in	  order	  to	  
The	  Mubarak	  regime’s	  tactic	  
can	  be	  summarised	  as	  one	  of	  
embracing	  Islamic	  demands	  
in	  principle	  in	  order	  to	  
neutralise	  them	  in	  practice.	  
However,	  this	  tactic	  was	  not	  
without	  a	  price.	  Conservative	  
forces	  began	  to	  permeate	  
state	  institutions.	  



























maintain	   as	   much	   of	   the	   old	   order	   as	  
possible.	   President	   Mubarak	   who	   stood	  
for	   the	   system	   had	   turned	   into	   a	   burden	  
for	  its	  maintenance.	  
Consequently,	   the	   “January	   25	   Revolu-­‐
tion”	   was	   not	   a	   classic	   revolution.	   It	   did	  
neither	   overthrow	   the	   system,	   nor	   alter	  
the	   elites	   or	   destroy	   their	   institutions,	   or	  
reverse	   the	   social	   situation.	  Nevertheless,	  
even	   though	   power	   structures	   and	   pat-­‐
terns	   were	   not	   removed,	   February	   13,	  
2011	   set	   an	   end	   to	   authoritarian	  
despotism	   and	   initiated	   a	   process	   of	  
power	   sharing;	   a	   passive	   revolution	  
characterised	   by	   the	   absorption	   of	   the	  
“enemies’	  elites”	  into	  the	  system.2	  	  
A	  passive	  revolution	  in	  the	  making	  
With	   Mubarak’s	   resignation,	   supreme	  
power	   was	   transferred	   to	   the	   Supreme	  
Council	  of	  Armed	  Forces	  
(SCAF).	   The	   SCAF	   has	  
controlled	  the	  transition	  
process	  ever	  since.	  From	  
the	  onset,	  the	  army	  had	  
made	   it	   clear;	   it	  
considered	   transition	   as	  
a	   technical	  and	  not	  as	  a	  
political	   process.	   The	  
army’s	   major	   concern	  
has	   been	   maintaining	  
stability	   and	   continuity.	  
Considering	   secular	   leftist	   and	   liberal	  
protest	   groups’	   demands	   for	   a	   funda-­‐
mental	   break	   with	   the	   Mubarak-­‐era,	   de-­‐
radicalised	   moderate	   Islamists	   who	   are	  
opposed	   to	   any	   revolutionary	   turmoil,	  
appeared	   as	   natural	   allies	   in	   the	   SCAF’s	  
struggle	   for	   maintaining	   the	   dominant	  
system.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Antonio	   Gramsci,	   Selections	   from	   the	   Prison	  
Notebooks,	  New	  York,	  2005.	  	  
Islamisation	   had	   absorbed	   de-­‐radicalised	  
and	   moderated	   Islamists	   into	   the	   domi-­‐
nant	   system;	   however	   they	   had	   been	  
denied	   legalisation	   and	   political	   partici-­‐
pation.	   President	  Mubarak’s	   fall	   removed	  
most	  of	   the	   legal	  barriers	   and	  opened	  up	  
the	   way	   to	   party	   politics.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	  
the	  “Revolution”,	  Islamists	  came	  in	  various	  
shades	   to	   the	  political	   arena.	   The	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood	   founded	   the	   Freedom	   and	  
Justice	  Party	  and	  even	  Salafis,	  who	  under	  
Mubarak	   had	   been	   considered	   an	  
apolitical	   movement,	   decided	   to	   form	  
parties	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  elections.	  
Participation	   initiated	   further	  moderation	  
in	   discourse	   and	   appearance.	   While	  
Islamists	   have	   gained	   a	   dominant	   role	   in	  
post-­‐Mubarak	  Egypt,	   Islamist	  parties	  have	  
been	  careful	  to	  appear	  modest.	  They	  have,	  
for	   the	  most	   part	   avoided	   touching	   upon	  
controversial	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   role	   of	  
women	   or	   Copts	   and	   they	   have	   made	  
rather	   vague	   state-­‐
ments	   regarding	   the	  
implementation	   of	   reli-­‐
gious	   law.	   A	   moderate	  
discourse	   aimed	   at	  
reaching	   out	   to	   non-­‐
Islamist	   constituencies,	  
to	   national	   and	   inter-­‐
national	   media,	   foreign	  
partners	   and	   investors	  
and	   to	   the	   business	  
circles.	   In	   the	   face	   of	  
pervasive	   corruption,	   the	   religiousness	  
and	   integrity	   of	   leading	   Islamist	   political	  
figures	   was	   however	   the	   strongest	  
message	  to	  their	  constituencies.	  	  
This	   strategy	   of	   moderation	   certainly	  
contributed	   to	   the	   Islamists’	   landslide	  
victory	   in	   the	   country’s	   first	   free	  
parliamentary	   elections	   after	   President	  
Mubarak’s	   departure.	   Different	   Islamist	  
parties	  all	  together	  reached	  more	  than	  70	  
per	   cent	   in	   votes.	   Consequently	   Islamists	  
While	  Islamists	  have	  gained	  a	  
dominant	  role	  in	  post-­‐Mubarak	  
Egypt,	  Islamist	  parties	  have	  been	  
careful	  to	  appear	  modest.	  They	  
have,	  for	  the	  most	  part	  avoided	  
touching	  upon	  controversial	  issues	  
such	  as	  the	  role	  of	  women	  or	  
Copts	  and	  they	  have	  made	  rather	  
vague	  statements	  regarding	  the	  
implementation	  of	  religious	  law.	  



























will	   also	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	  writing	   the	  
country’s	  new	  constitution.	  
However,	   involvement	   in	   representative	  
politics	   has	   also	   disclosed	   the	   deep	  
fractions	   between	   the	   different	   Islamist	  
parties.	  Whereas	  Islamist	  politics	  had	  been	  
thought	  to	  be	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood	   and	   groups	   which	   derived	  
from	   it,	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   strong	   Salafi	  
political	   party	   has	   revealed	   the	   existence	  
of	  a	  strong	  Islamist	  alternative.	  While	  both	  
groups	   are	   committed	   to	   the	   telos	   of	   an	  
Islamic	   order,	   methods,	   approaches	   and	  
appearance	  strongly	  differ,	  not	  to	  mention	  
different	   interpretations	   of	   religious	  
sources.	   Differences	   are	   also	   reflecting	  
diverging	   social	   constituencies	   and	   their	  
conflicting	  interests.	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   the	  Muslim	   Brotherhood	   as	  
well	   as	   the	   Salafis	   have	   decided	   to	  
nominate	   candidates	   for	   presidential	  
elections	   points	   at	   the	   on-­‐going	   transfor-­‐
mation	   connected	   with	   political	   party	  
activism.	  	  
The	   long	   road	   of	   integration	  
through	  moderation	  
De-­‐radicalization	   and	   moderation	   are	  
long-­‐term	   processes	   which	   are	   usually	  
emanating	   from	   the	   elites	   of	  movements	  
and	   rarely	   from	   the	   grassroots.	   Initially	  
based	   on	   tactical	   considerations,	   shifts	   in	  
methods	  and	  behaviour	  usually	  also	  evoke	  
changes	  in	  ideology.	  	  
In	   the	   1970s	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood,	  
which	   is	   considered	   as	   the	   mother	   of	  
contemporary	   Islamism	   in	   Egypt,	   made	   a	  
serious	   tactical	   shift.	   After	   years	   of	   cruel	  
persecution	   under	   President	   Nasser,	   the	  
leadership	  decided	  to	  give	  up	  its	  claim	  for	  
domination	  and	  instead	  adopted	  the	  path	  
of	   integration	  with	   the	   prevalent	   system.	  
This	  serious	  shift	  in	  strategy	  was	  the	  result	  
of	   a	   “Gentlemen’s	   agreement”	   with	   Pre-­‐
sident	   Sadat.	   In	   return	   for	   de-­‐
radicalization,	   the	   regime	   tolerated	   the	  
MB	  as	   long	  as	   it	   confined	   itself	   to	   Islamic	  
preaching,	   stayed	   out	   of	   politics	   and	  
refrained	   from	   violence	   and	   avoided	  
criticism	   of	   the	   president,	   his	   family	   and	  
his	   policies.	   In	   Sadat’s	   power	   system,	  
moderate	   Islamist	   movements,	   and	   in	  
particular	   the	   MB	   functioned	   as	   a	  
counterbalance	   to	   Communist	   and	   Arab	  
socialist	  groups.	  	  
President	   Mubarak	   continued	   Sadat’s	  
strategy	  of	  toleration	  without	  legalisation,	  
but	   he	   conceded	   comparably	   more	  
political	   space	   to	   the	   Islamists.	   Members	  
of	   the	   Brotherhood	   were	   allowed	   to	  
participate	   in	   a	   confined	   and	   controlled	  
democratic	   space.	   From	   the	   1980s	   on	  
members	   of	   the	   Brotherhood	   ran	   as	  
independent	   candidates	   in	   parliamentary	  
election	  and	  in	  the	  elections	  for	  profession	  
syndicates.	  Political	   involvement	  enforced	  
the	   breaks	   within	   the	   movement.	   The	  
question	   how	   far	   should	   political	  
involvement	   go	   divided	   the	   movement.	  
Older	   members	   of	   the	   leadership	   feared	  
that	  political	   involvement	  might	  challenge	  
the	  regime	  and	  provoke	  its	  anger,	  while	  a	  
younger	   generation	   defended	   the	   idea	  
that	   only	   political	   involvement	   can	   bring	  
about	  change.	  	  
“Taking	   part”	   in	   the	   political	   game	  
certainly	   affected	   the	   actors.	   Political	  
participation	  not	  only	  shaped	  appearance,	  
methods	  and	  behaviour	  but	  also	  gradually	  
induced	   change	   in	   ideology.	   Participation	  
in	   elections	   and	   representation	   in	  
parliament	  led	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  from	  
ideological	   conceptions	   to	   political	  
pragmatism.	  	  
Islamist	   intellectuals	   opened	   up	   to	  
universal	   discourses.	   Faced	   with	   the	  
despotism	   of	   illiberal	   authoritarian	  
regimes	  they	  increasingly	  adopted	  notions	  
of	   democracy,	   human	   rights,	   political	  
freedoms	   and	   accountability	   into	   their	  



























conceptions.	  What	  Asef	   Bayat	   and	   others	  
have	   termed	   as	   “post-­‐Islamism”	   repre-­‐
sents	  an	  endeavour	  to	  fuse	  religiosity	  and	  
rights,	   faith	   and	   freedom,	   Islam	   and	  
liberty.3	  	  
Amr	   Hamzawy	   and	   Nathan	   Brown4	  
analysed	   that	   the	   Muslim	   Brotherhood’s	  
religious	  and	  moral	  platform	  in	  parliament	  
clearly	   declined	   in	   salience	   over	   the	   last	  
ten	   years	   and	   that	   Brotherhood	   deputies	  
had	   been	   more	   preoccupied	   with	   parlia-­‐
mentary	  debates	  on	  constitutional	  amend-­‐
ments,	   political	   freedoms	   and	   human	  
rights	  issues.	  	  
Integration	  with	  a	  bourgeois	  system	  which	  
was	  established	  by	  economic	  liberalisation	  
policies	   implied	   also	   the	   movement’s	  
embourgeoisement.	   Many	   members	   of	  
the	   organisation’s	   leadership	   are	   them-­‐
selves	   successful	   businessmen	   who	   have	  
benefited	   from	   market	   liberalisation.	  
Hence,	   the	   MB	   adopted	  
an	   economic	   discourse	  
which	   has	   reflected	   the	  
interests	   of	   its	   leading	  
members	   and	   potent	  
supporters.	   The	   process	  
of	   embourgeoisement	  
was	   accompanied	   by	  
gradual	   de-­‐ideologization	  
and	   the	   adoption	   of	  
political	  pragmatism.	  This	  did	  not	  entail	   a	  
departure	   from	   Islamic	   tenets,	   but	   rather	  
from	   ideological	   conceptions	   which	  
seemed	   more	   and	   more	   unrealistic	   in	   a	  
globalized	  world.	  The	  MB	  has	  advocated	  a	  
notion	   of	   Islam	   which	   has	   been	   compa-­‐
tible	   with	   liberal	   market	   economy.	   The	  
MB’s	   economic	   views	   have	   been	   in	   line	  
with	   the	   Mubarak	   regime’s	   economic	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   Bayat,	   Asef,	   Making	   Islam	   Democratic.	   Social	  
Movements	  and	  the	  Post-­‐Islamist	  Turn,	  2007.	  
 
4	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   Amr,	   Between	  
Religion	  and	  Politics,	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liberalisation	   policies.	   Its	   economic	  
program	   has	   embraced	   the	   reduction	   of	  
taxes,	   privatisation,	   and	   foreign	   invest-­‐
ments.5	  
While	   the	   Brotherhood’s	   marriage	   with	  
free	  market	  economy	  has	  converged	  with	  
the	   worldview	   of	   an	   increasingly	   conser-­‐
vative	  bourgeois	  middle-­‐class,	  it	  has	  at	  the	  
same	   time	   reduced	   its	   contacts	   with	   the	  
lower	   classes	   to	   social	   and	   charity	   work	  
through	   its	   charity	   organisations.	   The	  MB	  
has	  mainly	   found	  political	   support	   among	  
the	   upper-­‐middle	   classes,	   but	   the	  
movement	   has	   been	   increasingly	   lacking	  
the	   enthusiasm	   and	   the	   social	   dimension	  
that	   would	   infect	   the	   impoverished	  
masses.	  	  
The	   Muslim	   Brotherhood’s	   moderation	  
and	   gradual	   rapprochement	   with	   the	  
bourgeois	   centre	   induced	   also	   the	   de-­‐
radicalisation	  of	  more	   radical	  elements	  of	  
the	   Islamist	   spectrum.	  
The	   Salafis’	   decision	   to	  
form	  political	  parties	  and	  
to	   participate	   in	   elec-­‐
tions	   represents	   a	  
dramatic	   tactical	   shift	  
towards	   integration	  with	  
the	   system,	   comparable	  
to	   that	   made	   by	   the	  
Muslim	   Brotherhood	   in	  
the	  1970s.	  	  
Salafism	   does	   not	   stand	   for	   a	   united	  
movement,	   but	   rather	   consists	   of	   a	  
collection	   of	   ultra-­‐orthodox	   sheikhs,	   who	  
have	   their	   own	   following	   and	   their	   own	  
associations.	   	   Their	   common	   aim	   is	   to	  
restore	   the	   purity	   of	   early	   Islam.	   They	  
thereby	   refer	   to	   the	   time	   of	   the	   prophet	  
and	  the	  early	  generations	  of	  his	   followers	  
(Salaf).	  This	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  simple	  return	  
to	   the	   past,	   but	   rather	   aims	   at	   freeing	  
Islam	   from	   historical	   deviations,	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   Avi	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   The	   GOP	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Egypt:	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The	  Salafis’	  decision	  to	  form	  
political	  parties	  and	  to	  
participate	  in	  elections	  
represents	  a	  dramatic	  tactical	  
shift	  towards	  integration	  with	  
the	  system,	  comparable	  to	  that	  
made	  by	  the	  Muslim	  
Brotherhood	  in	  the	  1970s.	  



























distortions	  and	  alterations	  and	  at	  restoring	  
an	  idealised	  pure	  and	  pristine	  Islam.	  	  
Salafi	   groups	  mainly	   gained	   a	   foothold	   in	  
rural-­‐urban	  eras.	  These	  are	   impoverished,	  
previously	   rural	   areas	   at	   the	   periphery	   of	  
growing	   cities,	   inhabited	   by	   poor	   people	  
with	   mainly	   poor	   educa-­‐
tion	   backgrounds.	   In	   the	  
absence	   of	   the	   state,	  
mosques	   have	   been	   the	  
centres	  of	  authority,	  infor-­‐
mation	   exchange	   and	  
personal	   encounter.	   Mos-­‐
que	   related	   organisations	  
as	   charity	   and	   welfare	  
networks	   or	   education	  
institutes	   have	   played	   an	  
important	   role	   in	   the	   socialisation	   of	  
youth.	  	  
The	   Mubarak	   regime	   tolerated	   the	  
proliferation	   of	   Salafism,	   as	   it	   hoped	   that	  
Salafi	   groups	   would	   counterbalance	   the	  
Muslim	   Brotherhood,	   but	   also	   because	  
Salafism	   used	   to	   be	   a	   politically	   quietist	  
movement	   which	   stood	   aloof	   from	   poli-­‐
tics.	  The	  movement	  also	  benefited	   largely	  
from	   conservative	   donors	   on	   the	   Arabian	  
Peninsula.	  With	   their	  help	  many	  Salafi	   TV	  
stations	   emerged	   over	   the	   last	   years,	  
emitting	   the	   movement’s	   clear	   and	  
comprehensible	   call	   for	   purification.	  
Consequently	   Salafism	   grew	   to	   an	  
influential	  religious	  trend.	  	  
Although,	   Salafis	   were	   politically	   quietist,	  
people	   with	   inclinations	   to	   conservative	  
Salafi	   interpretations	   of	   Islam	   gained	  
influence	   at	   the	   lower	   echelons	   of	  
religious	   and	   judicial	   authorities.	   Court	  
decisions	   lean	   on	   conservative	   interpre-­‐
tations	   of	   Islamic	   law	   and	   increasingly	  
conservative	   views	   within	   al-­‐Azhar,	   the	  
highest	   religious	   authority	   in	   Egypt	  
increasingly	   challenged	   the	   regime’s	  
hegemony.	  	  
Despite	   of	   being	   a	   movement	   which	  
appeals	   to	   a	   great	   extend	   to	   the	   under-­‐
dogs	   in	   society,	   Salafis	   have	   hardly	  
criticised	   capitalism	   or	   market	   economy.	  
Their	   concerns	   rather	   revolve	   around	  
moral	   issues	   as	   the	   separation	   of	   sexes,	  
moral	   conduct	   and	   an	   Islamic	   lifestyle.	  
Although	   their	   religious	   views	   converge	  
with	   extremists,	   the	  
majority	   of	   Salafis	   have	  
rejected	   the	   use	   of	   vio-­‐
lence	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  
their	   aspired	   Islamic	  
system.	  	  
The	   decision	   to	   form	  
political	   parties	   and	   to	  
participate	   in	   elections	  
points	  at	  growing	  pragma-­‐
tism.	   The	   decision	   to	  
participate	   does	   not	   entail	   a	   departure	  
from	   the	   utopian	   dream	   of	   restoring	  
pristine	   Islam,	   but	   it	   points	   at	   the	  
conviction	   that	   this	   dream	   can	   be	   only	  
achieved	   through	   integration	   with	   the	  
system.	   Salafis	   have	   explained	   their	  
tactical	  shift	  as	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  public	  
benefit	  (maslaha).	  	  
Experiences	   with	   the	   transformation	  
processes	  of	  other	  movements	   show	   that	  
de-­‐radicalisation	   in	   methods	   and	   tactics	  
evolves	   into	  moderation	   in	   approaches	   in	  
favour	  of	  growing	  pragmatism.	  
Paradoxically,	   the	   formation	   of	   political	  
parties	   supports	   the	   centralisation	   and	  
bureaucratisation	   of	   movements.	   This	  
“professionalization”	   almost	   inevitably	  
induces	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   political	  
organization	   from	   the	   religious	   and	   social	  
movement.	   This	   outsourcing	   of	   the	  
political	   agenda	   can	   be	   evaluated	   as	   a	  
process	   of	   secularization.	   	   However,	   this	  
should	   not	   be	   misinterpreted	   as	   a	  
departure	  from	  religion,	  religious	  concepts	  
or	   ultra-­‐conservatism,	   but	   rather	   per-­‐
ceived	   as	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   religious	  
sacred	  from	  the	  political	  realm.	  
The	  Mubarak	  regime	  tolerated	  
the	  proliferation	  of	  Salafism,	  
as	  it	  hoped	  that	  Salafi	  groups	  
would	  counterbalance	  the	  
Muslim	  Brotherhood,	  but	  also	  
because	  Salafism	  used	  to	  be	  a	  
politically	  quietist	  movement	  
which	  stood	  aloof	  from	  
politics.	  




























While	   the	   emergence	   of	   Islamist	   parties	  
has	   understandably	   caused	   concerns	   for	  
the	   country’s	   and	   the	   region’s	   stability,	  
the	   formation	   of	   Islamist	   parties,	   their	  
participation	   in	   elections	   and	   their	  
interactions	  with	  other	   Islamist	  as	  well	  as	  
with	  secular	  parties	  can	  be	  also	  perceived	  
as	   further	   steps	   in	   a	   long	   and	   enduring	  
transformation	  process.	  Reformed	  Islamist	  
parties	   all	   over	   the	   Muslim	   World	   have	  
undergone	   a	   process	   of	   de-­‐ideologisation	  
and	   adaptation	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	  
globalised	   and	   highly	   interconnected	  
liberal	   market	   economy.	   Paradoxically	  
political	   professionalism	   has	   inevitably	  
implied	   also	   the	   secularisation	  of	   political	  
action	   pushing	   the	   sacred	   out	   of	   politics.	  	  
Islamist	  conceptions	  of	  state	  and	  economy	  
might	   have	   lost	   power,	   but	   Islamist	  
conceptions	  of	  values	  and	  society	  are	  still	  
appealing	   in	   face	  of	  pervasive	   corruption,	  
Western	  domination	  and	  felt	  cultural	  sell-­‐
out.	  	  
The	   integration	   of	   de-­‐radicalised	   and	  
moderated	   socially	   conservative	   Islamist	  
groups	  with	  Capitalism	  promises	   not	   only	  
the	   prevention	   of	   political	   and	   economic	  
turmoil,	   but	   also	   guarantees	   the	  
reinforcement	   of	   the	   existing	   patterns	   of	  
domination.	  Hence,	   less	  than	  a	  revolution	  
in	   its	   classical	   sense,	   the	   “January	   25	  
Revolution”	   rather	   falls	   into	   Gramsci’s	  
concept	  of	  a	  “passive	   revolution”.	  Passive	  
Revolution	   describes	   the	   dominant	  
classes’	   strategies	   of	   preventing	   revolu-­‐
tionary	   turmoil	   by	   integrating	   moderate	  
elements	   of	   the	   emergent	   revolutionary	  
classes	   into	   the	   system	   and	   of	   thereby	  
strengthening	  its	  hegemony.  
 
Note:	  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  article	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published	   at	   LSE	   IDEAS	   (Centre	   for	   the	  
study	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   international	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